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Title III of the ADA Allows a Qualified Disabled
Entrant to Use a Motorized Cart on the Professional
Golf Tour: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CIVIL RIGHTS - AMERICANS wrH DISABILITIES
ACT - The Supreme Court of the United States held that Title III
of the ADA protects access to professional golf tournaments by a
qualified entrant with a disability, and that a disabled participant's
use of a motorized golf cart during play would not fundamentally
alter the nature of tournament play.
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S.Ct. 1879 (2001)
PGA Tour, Inc. sponsors and cosponsors three annual golf tours,
which include the PGA Tour, the Nike Tour, and the Senior PGA
Tour.' A player may gain access to the tours through a number of
different processes.2 Casey Martin was an acclaimed amateur golfer
despite his battle with a life long disability defined under the
Americans with Disability Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 3 Specifically, Martin
was born with Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, which is a
degenerative circulatory disorder that disturbs the blood flow to his
right leg.4 The disease is progressive and has now atrophied his
right leg.5 The pain became so extreme in his later college years
1. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001). PGA Tour, Inc. was formed in 1968
as a not-for-profit entity. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. CL. at 1884. The PGA Tour is the highest
level of competition, while the Nike Tour is the secondary tier. Id. The Senior PGA Tour is
for those attaining a minimum age. Id at 1885.
2. Id at 1884. A competitor may gain entry to an official tour by succeeding in an open
qualifying round conducted before each tour. Id. The majority of competitors gain entry to
either the PGA or Nike Tour through the qualifying school ("Q-School") process. Id. Any
golfer may gain entry to the school by paying a $3,000 entry fee and submitting two letters
of reference from tour members. Id. The Q-School entails three rounds in which the pool of
contestants is continually thinned. Id. Of those advancing to the third round, about
one-fourth gain entry to the PGA Tour. Id. The remainder are admitted to the Nike Tour, but
may advance to the PGA Tour based on performance standards. Id.
3. Id. at 1885. The Americans with Disabilities Act provides in part: "The term
'disability' means, with respect to an individual - (A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual..." 42 U.S.C. §
12102 (1990).
4. PGA Tour Inc., 121 S. Ct at 1885. Walking for Martin not only causes great pain and
fatigue, but also creates the risk of hemorrhaging, developing blood clots, and fracturing his
tibia so badly that amputation may be necessary. Id. at 1885-86.
5. Id. at 1885. Atrophy is defined as a decrease in size or wasting away of a bodily part
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that Martin requested, and was granted, a waiver of the walking
rule for NCAA golf competitions.6 Following college, Martin entered
the Q-School operated by the PGA and successfully surpassed the
first two elimination rounds, which permitted the use of electric
carts.7 Martin filed a request, supported by medical records, for the
waiver of the walking rule enforced by the PGA in the third round,
but the PGA Tour refused the waiver.
8
Martin filed a complaint in United States District Court of
Oregon to enjoin the defendant from enforcing its mandatory
walking rule based on the anti-discrimination clause to public
accommodations embodied in Title III of the ADA.9 The district
court granted Martin a preliminary injunction and, with the use of a
cart, Martin successfully completed the final stage of the Q-School
to earn a place on the 1998 Nike Tour.10 The district court then
granted Martin partial summary judgment, rejecting defendant's
argument that the PGA was considered a "private club" under the
ADA, and held that the PGA Tour was considered a place of public
accommodation within the scope of the ADA. 1
Upon bench trial of the remaining issue, the district court found
that the modification of the walking rule for Martin was a
reasonable accommodation under Tile III of the ADA and that this
or tissue. THE NEW MERRUM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 62 (1989).
6. PGA Tour Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1886. Until that time, Martin refused the use of a cart
and was able to attain 17 junior tournament victories, a state high school championship, and
an NCAA championship, despite the significant pain he endured. Id. at 1885.
7. Id. at 1886. Three sets of rules govern all PGA sponsored tournaments, including
the Q-School. Id. at 1884-85. The Rules of Golf are the general rules promulgated by the
USGA (the basic governing body of golf), which apply to all manners of golf. Id. at 1884. The
USGA Rules contain no prohibition on the use of carts. Id. at 1884-85. The "hard card" rules
are PGA addendums to the rules governing tournament play. Id. at 1885. The "hard card" has
always prohibited carts in PGA Tournaments, but has allowed carts in the first two rounds of
the Q-School. Id. The "weekly notices" are specific rules concerning course conditions or
course specific regulations. Id.
8. Id. at 1886. The PGA refused the waiver on the basis that it would alter the nature
of the tournament by providing Martin with an advantage due to the elimination of stanina
as an element of the tournament. Id.
9. Id. Title ll of the ADA provides: "[no individual shall be discriminated against on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who
owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1990).
10. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F Supp. 1320, 1322 (D. Or. 1998).
11. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323-27. Title Ill of the ADA provides exemption from
coverage to public accommodations or services operated by private entities. 42 U.S.C. §
12187 (1990). The court found that this exemption operates as a benefit to the public, and
that an operator of a private accommodation may not establish private enclaves within the
facility to escape the reach of the ADA. Martin, 984 F Supp. at 1327.
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modification did not fundamentally alter the nature of PGA
tournaments. 2 The court found fatigue in the game of golf
insignificant, and that Martin's use of a cart would not provide him
with a competitive advantage over the other competitors. 13 The
court therefore granted Martin a permanent injunction, which
afforded Martin the use of a motorized cart in the PGA Tour, Nike
Tour, and any qualifying rounds in which Martin was eligible to
play.'
4
The PGA appealed to the Ninth Circuit, in which it challenged
the district court's ruling as to its classification as a public
accommodation under Title III of the ADA, and renewed its
contention that a modification of the walking rule would
fundamentally alter the nature of PGA tournaments. 15
The Ninth Circuit found that the highly selective procedures for
competition were irrelevant and that the PGA Tour golf courses fit
squarely within the ADA definition of public acconmodation. 6 The
court found no dispute about the fact that Martin's use of a cart
was a reasonable accommodation and moved to address, in an
individual fact-based inquiry, whether Martin's use of a cart would
fundamentally alter tournament golf by eliminating stamina as a
testing factor.'7 The majority found that fatigue was not an essential
aspect of the game of tournament golf and that Martin's
accommodation would only permit him access to a competition in
which he otherwise could not engage because of his disability.'
8
12. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F Supp. 1242, 1246-52 (D. Or. 1998). Title III provides
that discrimination includes:
a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when
such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can
demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of
such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations;
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1990).
13. Martin, 994 F Supp. at 1250-51.
14. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2000).
15. Martin, 204 F3d at 996.
16. Id. at 999. Title III of the ADA provides: "The following private entities are
considered public accommodations for the purposes of this subchapter ... L) a gymnasium,
health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation." 42 U.S.C. §
12181(7) (1990).
17. Martin, 204 F.3d at 999-1001.
18. Id. at 1000. The court found that Martin's disability provides fatigue in excess of
other competitors due to the distance he still has to walk with a cart. Id. The court also
noted that fatigue is mostly a psychological phenomenon, in which stress and motivation are
the key factors. Id.
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The PGA Tour petitioned for a writ of certiorari.19 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle a conflict among
the circuits regarding the application of the ADA to professional
golf tournaments.
20
The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were "whether the
Act protects access to professional golf tournaments by a qualified
entrant with a disability; and whether a disabled contestant may be
denied the use of a golf cart because it would 'fundamentally alter
the nature' of tournaments, § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), to allow him to
ride when other contestants must walk."21 The majority found that
PGA Tour, Inc. competitions were expressly included as places of
public accommodation and subject to regulation under the ADA.
22
The majority also affirmed the lower court's decision that fatigue is
not an essential aspect of the game of golf and that Martin's
accommodation would not fundamentally alter the nature of PGA
events.
23
Before addressing the specific inquiries of the case, Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, investigated the purpose and
application of the ADA.24 The Court recognized that Congress
enacted the ADA in 1990 to remedy widespread discrimination
against disabled persons based on a realization that discrimination
against the disabled was becoming a widespread and pervasive
social problem.25  Congress thus concluded that there was
compelling evidence that a nationwide mandatory agenda must be
instituted to remedy discrimination and integrate disabled
individuals "into the economic and social mainstream of American
society."26 The majority identified the "comprehensive character" of
the ADA as one of its "impressive strengths" and as evidence that
the Congress intended the ADA to "effectuate a sweeping
purpose."
27
Title III of the ADA generally prohibits discrimination on the
19. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 30 (2000).
20. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct at 1889. In a similar case against the USGA, the Seventh
Circuit held that the modification of the walking rule would fundamentally alter the nature
of competitions by eliminating the critical factor of fatigue. Ollinger v. United States Golf
Assn., 205 F3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000).
21. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1884.
22. Id. at 1890.
23. Id. at 1897.
24. Id. at 1889.
25. Id.
26. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1889.
27. Id. The ADA prohibits the unequal treatment of disabled persons in employment
(Title I), public services (Title II), and public accommodations (Title II). Id.
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basis of disability in the "full and equal enjoyment of goods,
services, or facilities of any place of public accommodation."28 The
legislation provides twelve categories of accommodations, to which
legislative history indicates courts should apply a liberal
construction.29 The ADA expressly lists golf courses within the list
of public accommodations and the Supreme Court found the PGA
golf tours to fit squarely within the ADA definition.30 The majority
also noted that the PGA "leases and operates" properties on which
to conduct its Q-School and tours, in which large numbers of the
general public vie for the privilege to compete.31 The PGA, in its
distribution of this privilege, cannot provide unequal treatment to
disabled individuals in the "full and equal use of goods, facilities, or
services."32 The majority found that Martin was clearly included in
this class and Title III clearly forbids the PGA from refusing Martin
entrance to its tours.3
The PGA fostered the argument that the competing golfers were
not members of the class protected under the scope of the ADA.3
The PGA argued that Title III concerns "clients or customers" of
public accommodations and that the PGA operates a place of
entertainment, in which Martin's discrimination claim would be job
related and barred by Title I application.3
Justice Stevens rejected the PGA's argument and found that the
PGA offers simultaneously at least two privileges; that of (1)
viewing the tournament; and (2) actively competing in its
tournaments, regardless of classification as either a golf course or
place of entertainment.3 The Court reasoned that the PGA opened
both its Q-School and qualifying tournaments to the members of
the general public and may not discriminate against those players
exercising their opportunity to compete.
37
The Court found the PGA's position to be in conflict with the
literal text of the ADA, as well as its liberal purpose, to read Title
28. Id. See supra note 9.
29. Id. at 1890. See supra note 16.
30. Id.
31. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1890.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1891.
35. Id. Title I would not apply to Martin since the district court had concluded that
Martin was considered an independent contractor, and independent contractors do not fall
within the protection of the ADA. Id.




III's coverage any less broadly.38 The majority noted that its
application of Title Ill was consistent with precedent in the
analogous context of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which similarly
prohibited public accommodations from discriminating on the basis
of race, religion, or national origin.
39
After determining that the PGA fell within the scope of Title III,
the majority moved to define the proper interpretation of the term
"discrimination" within the ADA.40 The PGA did not contest that a
motorized cart is a reasonable modification necessary for Martin to
compete, but narrowed the issue on appeal to whether the
accommodation to Martin would "fundamentally alter the nature" of
PGA Tour events.
4'
The majority stated that a modification may fundamentally alter
the game by changing an essential aspect of play for all
competitors or alternatively by slightly modifying play for a
disabled golfer in a manner that would provide an advantage over
other competitors.42 The Court found that modification of the
walking rule, as applied to Martin, would not work a fundamental
alteration to tournament play in either sense.
43
Justice Stevens observed that the use of a cart is not
incompatible with the essential character of the sport of golf." The
majority noted that the game of golf has metamorphosed over the
years by adapting rules, altering equipment, modifying course
38. Id.
39. Id. See also Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (holding that the definition of "place
of entertainment" as a public accommodation, applied to competitors in sport, as well as
spectators); Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474, 477 (E.D. Va. 1966) (holding that
Title II of CRA is not limited to spectators if place of exhibition provides facilities for the
public to participate in the entertainment).
40. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1893. The proper interpretation of discrimination is
essential to determine whether the PGA as a public accommodation discriminated against
Martin under 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Id. Title HI defines discrimination as
a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when
such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages or. accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can
demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of
such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations;
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1990).
41. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1893.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1894. Justice Stevens noted that the essence of the game was reflected in the
original Rules of Golf, which describe the essential aspect to be the use of shot-making in
order to progress the ball to the hole in as few strokes as possible in accordance with the
rules. Id.
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design, and finally in adopting the use of the motorized cart.45 The
Court noted the use of carts is so popular that it is encouraged in
many levels of golf and the Rules of Golf, which govern amateur
and professional play worldwide, neither forbids, nor penalizes a
player for using a cart.46 Thus, the majority found the PGAs
walking rule an unessential factor in the game of tournament golf.
47
Justice Stevens subsequently stated that the walking rule was not
an indispensable aspect of PGA tournament play, citing many
instances in which PGA-sponsored golf events permit the use of
carts.48 PGA contended that golf at its highest level, including the
PGA and Nike Tours, is distinguishable from golf as generally
played.49 The goal at this highest level, PGA argued, is to assess
performance levels of the competitors, a task that is only accurate
if players are subject to identical rules.5 0 The PGA stated that
waiver of the walking rule would dismiss the element of fatigue
from the skill of shot-making for a contestant, and would
contradict the purpose of the highest level of golf in assessing skill
on equal ground.51 Similarly, the PGA asserted that variance in
conditions resulting from the waiver of the walking rule would
have a definite outcome-affecting nature, which would
fundamentally alter the nature of the PGA:s highest level of
competition.
52
The majority of the Court dismissed the PGA's arguments, stating
that golf is a game in which it is impossible to guarantee that
competitors will perform under identical conditions or that ability
will be the sole means of determination of outcome.5' The Court
next reinforced the district court's finding that the fatigue endured
by competitors in walking the course on the PGA's four-day
45. Id.
46. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1894. The PGA's "hard card" rule outlawing carts in
tournament play is based on an optional condition, located in an appendix to the Rules of
Golf. Id. at 1895.
47. Id.
48. Id. The PGA permits carts in its Senior PGA Tour, open qualifying events for
tournaments, the first two stages of Q-School, the third stage of Q-School until 1997, and
during certain rounds in PGA and Nike Tours. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1894.
52. Id. at 1895.
53. Id. Justice Stevens cited weather, course conditions, and luck as variables that may
essentially vary conditions in assessing the competitor's skills. Id. The Court also found that
chance may have a more definite impact on outcome at its highest level than fatigue that
results from the PGA's walking rule. Id.
2002 409
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tournaments could not be deemed to be significant.4 Justice
Stevens found that the extended time duration for walking the
course and the numerous opportunities for refreshment make
fatigue even less significant, and he argued that the most significant
impact on a golfer's fatigue results from the psychological stress
that burdens the competitor.5 The majority also recognized that
even when offered the use of a cart the majority of competitors
refuse, often to alleviate stress factors or for other strategic
reasons.
56
The majority next noted that even if the fatigue were to be
determined as a significant aspect of tournament play, the PGA's
failure to consider Martin's individual circumstances in the decision
to accommodate his disability is in contradiction to the text and
intent of the ADA.57 Justice Stevens recognized that for the PGA to
be in accord with the ADA, an individual inquiry must be made to
evaluate whether a modification for a particular individual's
disability would be reasonable and necessary in the particular
circumstances, and yet not act as a critical alteration to the nature
of the service provided.M The Court stated that elimination of an
"essential rule" would fundamentally alter the nature of the
competition, but the cart prohibition is at best peripheral to PGA
competitions, and thus may be waived in individual circumstances
and not provide a fundamental modification to tournament play.59
The PGA argued that rules for its elite competitions cannot be
altered under any circumstance without altering the nature of the
game, and such rules are therefore exempt from the reasonable
modification doctrine under Title III. 6° The majority noted that Title
III carves out no exception for professional athletics, but that the
54. Id. at 1896. The Court cited expert testimony on fatigue and physiology from the
district court, which provided that the calories expended walldng an 18-hole course
(approximately five miles) to be around 500 Calories, which would be nutritionally less than
the energy contained in a Big Mac. Id.
55. Id. The majority also cited that even under the greatest conditions of heat and
humidity, fatigue is more significantly effected by dehydration than by walking. Id.
56. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1896. A Nike Tour member testified in district court
that he preferred walking to keep rhythm, stay warm in lower temperatures, and to develop
an increased sense for the elements and the course. Id.
57. Id. The majority reiterated that the ADA was passed to prevent discrimination
against "individuals" as pertinent to provide equal accessibility unless the modification would
fundamentally alter the nature of the privilege offered. Id.
58. Id. See S.Rep. No. 101-116, at 61; H.R.Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 102; U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 1990, pt. 2, at pp. 303, 385 (stating that public accommodations are
required to make decisions based on facts applicable to individuals).
59. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1896.
60. Id.
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ADA expressly cites places of entertainment and golf courses,
depicting the intention of Congress to apply the statute to the
PGA:s competitions.
61
In applying the ADA to Martin in an individual capacity, the
majority found no evidence that modification of the walking rule
would fundamentally alter PGA tournament play.62 Justice Stevens
claimed that even if fatigue could influence the outcome of the
competition, it was an unchallenged finding of the district court
that Martin experiences greater fatigue with the use of a cart, due
to his disability, than his fellow competitors experience without the
use of a cart.63 The purpose of the walking rule is, in effect, not
compromised by the modification afforded to Martin.64 The
modification afforded to Martin can only be said to allow Martin to
compete in tournaments the PGA offers to the general public
possessing the requisite skills, which is precisely the requirement of
the ADA.65 The Court held that Martin's petition for the waiver of
the PGA's walking rule should have been granted.
66
In their dissent, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas found that the
majority had incorrectly distorted the literal text of the ADA and
expanded the ADA's scope beyond that intended by Congress.67 The
minority opinion first challenged the majority's holding that a
professional sport is included as a place of public accommodation
and that the expansive purpose of the ADA must cover Martin as a
"client or customer."68
Justice Scalia argued that if an expansive reading of Title III
were rendered, it might be argued that a place of accommodation
denying any disabled individual anything that might be considered a
privilege would be a violation of the ADA.69 Such a liberal reading
61. Id. at 1896-97. The Court recognized the precedent that the statute can be applied
even to those circumstances not expressly recognized by Congress. Pa. Dep't of Corrections
v. Yesky, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998).
62. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1897.
63. Id.
64. Id. The majority found that a modification to a peripheral rule without altering its
purpose cannot be said to provide a fundamental alteration. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The majority recognized that providing individual attention to a handful of
requests, which the PGA might receive from talented disabled athletes, to determine whether
the waiver of a rule would be tolerable would not provide the PGA with a substantial
burden. Id. at 1897-98.
67. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1897-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1898 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The minority noted that Title I of the ADA deals with
employment discrimination, Title II covers government discrimination (irrelevant at present),
and that Title I deals with public accommodation discrimination. Id. at 1898 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia emphasized that independent contractors are not covered by Title
2002
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has the effect of bringing employees and independent contractors
of all public accommodations within Title III because they enjoy
the privilege of labor.70
The dissenters further found the majority's liberal interpretation
of Title III unfounded.71 Rather, the minority contended that the
public accommodation law in its traditional interpretation only
applies to customers.72 Justice Scalia found the text of the statute
applicable only to the enjoyment of goods and services, and that
Congress plainly intended the person enjoying the service to be a
customer.73 The minority stated that where Title III addresses
discrimination by public accommodations in contractual
agreements, the other party to the contract is not afforded
protection, but only those clients of the contracting public
accommodation. 74
Justice Scalia contended that Title III has absolutely no
application to either employees or independent contractors.75 The
dissent claimed that if Title III were expanded beyond the scope of
clients and customers, the intention of the ADA would be
confused. 76  Likewise, the dissent conveyed that Congress's
limitation of Title I to employers with more than 15 employees is
intended to protect small public accommodations from altering
their nonpublic areas to adapt for a disabled employee.77 The
I, and that the district court had already determined that Martin was an independent
contractor. See e.g., Birchen v. Knights of Columbus, 116 F3d 310, 312 (8th Cir. 1997).
70. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1898 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices provided, for example, the
common law rule prohibiting innkeepers and other public establishments from refusing to
serve a customer without cause, which reinforces a narrow interpretation of the ADA. See
Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
571(1995); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241(1964).
73. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1898-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The justices cited, as
an example, the application of a place of public gathering, in which Title Ill would cover the
persons gathering at an auditorium, but those who contract to clean the auditorium would
not. Id. at 1899 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia looked further, to the Department of
Justice regulations, to reinforce the conclusion that Title II only applies to customers. Id.
The regulations state that the public accommodations requirement is to provide accessibility
to goods offered. Id. (citing 28 C.FR., Ch. 1, pt. 36, App. B, p. 650 (2000)).
75. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1899 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The ADA must be read in context and in line with the
intended statutory scheme. See Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989).
77. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1899 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The minority cited
examples of a small grocery store or laundromat as a proper exclusion. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia also contended that a business need not make accommodations
for disabled workers when hiring a painter, electrician, or other independent worker. Id.
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dissent found it ludicrous to eliminate the exceptions expressly
provided in Title I by engaging in a liberal reading of Title III,
which would enforce the ADA with respect to any public
accommodation offering the privilege of employment.78 Justice
Scalia found it incongruous to place the effect of Title III upon a
business merely due to its public service when other non-public
businesses are outside the scope of the Title.
79
Justice Scalia rejected the argument of the majority that Martin
could be classified as a customer of the PGA.8' He contended that
professional golfers participating in the PGA tour are no more
enjoying the entertainment of the tour than professional baseball
players enjoy the games in which they compete. 81 The dissent
found no merit in the claim that because golfers' remuneration is
contingent they should be given customer status, while those who
play in other professional fields for a fixed salary should not.8 2
Justice Scalia also noted that the listing of a golf course in Title I
is included under the subdivision of recreation, and contended that
it cannot be argued that Martin desired recreation from the PGA
Tour.m The minority rejected the majority's reliance on the Civil
Rights Act because a professional golfer practicing his profession is
not comparable to an ordinary individual attending an amusement
park.8
4
Justice Scalia also rejected the majority argument that the
Q-School offers privileges to the general public and found the skill
necessitated for entry into the school eliminates it as a public
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The United States filed an amicus brief recognizing that
employees are not covered under Title II, but that claims of independent contractors are
cognizable. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The United States based its argument on the inclusion
of independent contractors in Title II, but the minority found the argument frivolous because
it provided no possible interpretation of Title H that would simultaneously exclude
employees while providing coverage to independent contractors. Id. at 1900 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
80. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia conceded that professional players participate in
the game and use the facilities, but no one could logically conclude they are customers of
the professional sports club to which they belong. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1900 (Scala, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that
many independent contractors' salaries are contingent upon their success. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
83. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that Martin was not a golfer buying
recreation, but rather a professional selling it. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Daniel, 395 U.S. at 301).
2002 413
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privilege.85 In doing so, Justice Scalia indicated that the essence of
a tryout is not to entertain, but to hire, and that tryouts are not
distinguishable from open applications for any position at a place
of public accommodation.86 Justice Scalia held improper the
rationale that a business not only exists to sell goods or services,
but to provide the privilege of employment.87
The minority also found error in the majority's interpretation of
the "reasonable modifications" provision of the ADA.88 The ADA
only requires accessibility to public accommodations and not an
alteration of the general function of the facility to accommodate a
disabled patron.89 Justice Scalia contended that even if it is
conceded that Martin is a consumer, the PGA still has no duty to
alter the rules of the competition.90 The determination that the
walking rule is essential to the game is irrelevant to the PG~s
compliance with the statute because the statute only requires
access for Martin and not a game different than that provided to
the other competitors.91
The dissent stipulated that nowhere is it required the PGA must
follow the classic "essential" rules of golf, and that any government
division cannot deem rules, arbitrary in nature themselves,
non-essential. 92 If it is assumed that the PGA must follow the script
of classic golf, the Court must essentially decide the meaning of
golf.93 Justice Scalia sarcastically inferred that the Supreme Court
was overstepping its power in the determination of whether
walking is a fundamental aspect of golf.94 The minority maintained
that the Court should avoid the determination of this question
because it is the nature of a game to have no object but
amusement, and it is extremely difficult to determine whether any
85. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia claimed bar exams, professional sports
tryouts, and movie auditions are all examples of tryouts, which would not be public in
nature. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1901 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1901 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1902 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia depicted that the content of the
goods or services is not required to be altered. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). For example, a
photography store may not refuse the patronage of a disabled individual, but it is not
required to supply specially adapted cameras for the disabled. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1902 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of a game's arbitrary rules are essential.95 The minority argued that
at some point in continual minor modification of the rules, the
game would not be considered the same game. 6
The dissent then moved on to address the issue of whether the
modification provided Martin with a significant advantage over the
other players.97 Justice Scalia rejected the majority's contention that
chance is an uncontrollable variable, and instead claimed that
Martin's use of a cart would continually increase his chance of
winning during the entire competition.98 The dissent also argued
that the majority's decision to decide each case based on
individualized factual findings might result in a slippery slope that
would produce excess litigation.99 Justice Scalia found no basis in
the statute for the application of an individualized inquiry and
contended that the statute only requires equal access, and not an
equal chance to win.10 The dissent claimed it is essential to the
nature of a sport that measurement is determined by unevenly
distributed excellence, and that by eliminating any player's
weakness the fundamental nature of sport will be destroyed. 1 1
One should not take Justice Scalia's disagreement with the
majority to mean that the PGA ought not allow Martin the use of a
cart.' °2 The minority concluded that the sport's governing body
must decide that question, and was thus outside the scope of
review of the Supreme Court.103 Justice Scalia promoted a strong
stance by sports organizations against judicial interference with the
organization's autonomy.104 Justice Scalia found that the decision in
this case would provide a negative precedent, which would cause
sporting organizations to restrict voluntary grants of modifications
95. Id. at 1903 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The minority exposed 18-hole golf courses,
100-yard fields, and 90-foot baselines as all arbitrary rules, and noted that the only solid
backing for them is tradition and insistence by the ruling body within a sport. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
96. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1903 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1904 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court expressed the worry that litigation
could result, for example, from the parents of a little league player bringing suit to provide
four strikes for their child with attention deficit disorder. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The minority found ridiculous a promulgation of a
separate set of rules for the disabled than for those able bodied players. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
102. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. ct. at 1904 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 1905 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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and open tryouts.'0 5 The minority contended that the incentives
created by the majority would eventually negatively affect disabled
athletes.106
Discrimination against individuals possessing disabilities has
arisen in American society as a "serious and pervasive social
problem."'0 7 The Civil Rights Act and its subsequent case law set
the backdrop for the establishment of legislation for the protection
of disabled persons, and close similarities appear in the judicial
interpretation of both statutes.'0 8 The first case testing Congress's
power to enact legislation to remedy discrimination was Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States.'°9 An Atlanta motel owner
brought a declaratory judgment action attacking the
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("CRA"), in order to
continue a business practice to refuse accommodation to people of
color."0 The plaintiff contended that Congress exceeded the
commerce power delegated to it by the Constitution."' The Court
found that Congress had not exceeded its power under the
Commerce Clause by regulating the motel, which serves interstate
travelers, and that the motel clearly fell within broad definition of
public accommodation provided in Title II of the CRA."12 The
majority explained that Congress may have exercised other means
to remedy the disruption to interstate commerce, but that this was
a matter of policy outside the scope of judicial interpretation. 1 3
Following its declaration that Congress did have the power to
regulate discrimination under the Commerce Clause, the Court
defined the scope of the public accommodation provision contained
in the Civil Rights Act in an even broader fashion in Daniel v.
105. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990). Congress recognized that 43,000,000 Americans suffer
from some manner of physical or mental disability and that these individuals suffer
discrimination in areas such as "employment, housing, public accommodations, education,
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and
access to public services." Id.
108. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1892. The Civil Rights Act ("CRA7) of 1964 is similar
in its construction to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 42 U.S.C. § 2000. Title 11 of
the CRA prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin by
places of public accommodation. Id.
109. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 241.
110. Id. at 243.
111. Id. at 244. The Constitution provides in part, "[t]he Congress shall have the power
to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations; and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tibes." U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, ci. 3
112. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 261.
113. Id. at 262.
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Paul.114 In Daniel, a group of African-American residents brought
an action to enjoin the defendant from denying them entry to his
park, which contained accommodations such as swimming, boating,
miniature golf, and a snack bar.1 5 The majority established that the
snack bar was covered as a public accommodation under Title 11,
and the status of the snack bar automatically brought the entire
park under the regulation of the ADA.16 Justice Brennan's rationale
for the majority recognized that the overriding intent of Congress,
to eradicate discrimination demanded a broad judicial
interpretation of a public accommodation under Title 11.117 The
broad construction of public accommodation within the CRA
sufficiently demonstrated Congress's intent when it enacted
legislation for the protection of the disabled a few years later."8
In the wake of these landmark Civil Rights Act cases, Congress
made its first substantial step in protecting the disabled from
discrimination by enacting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973."1 After
two presidential vetoes in 1972, the Rehabilitation Act was signed
into law by President Nixon in September of 1973, and though
lacking force in many areas, the Act was a first major step in the
elimination of discrimination against the disabled, and acted as an
impetus for individual state actions. 20 The Act only prohibited
discrimination by federal executive agencies, federal grantees, and
federal contractors. 2' Many deficiencies have been found that
support the Act's classification as toothless legislation.'2 Its limited
114. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 298. The Civil Rights Act states: "All Persons shall be entitled
to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, . . . , without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000 §§ 201
(1964).
115. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 300-01.
116. Id. at 304-05.
117. Id. at 307.
118. Roy R. Galewski, The Casey Martin and Ford Olinger Cases: The Supreme Court
Takes a Swing at ADA Uncertainty, 21 PACE L REv. 411, 433 (2001).
119. Pub.L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973). The antidiscrimination sections are covered
under 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1982).
120. Robert E. Rains, A Pre-History of the Americans with Disabilities Act and some
Initial Thoughts as to its Constitutional Implications, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L Rev. 185, 189
(1992). The lack of coverage beyond federal associated parties, lack of significant
enforcement mechanisms, and lack of adequate funding were the significant deficiencies of
the Act, which worked against the goal of alleviating discrimination against disabled
individuals. Id. at 189-90.




coverage was one of the primary problems that faced the Act.123
The second problem was that the Act had an inadequate
enforcement mechanism to which the subsequent case law applied
a strict construction. 124 The final disabling quality of the legislation
was its lack of funding allocated to help address the problems of
discrimination.125 These deficiencies worked as a major roadblock
in the goal of eliminating discrimination, and subsequent case law
continued to hinder the legislation by applying to it a narrow
judicial interpretation.
1 26
The Supreme Court addressed the scope of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 in the case of Southeast Community College v. Davis.
27
The Court was presented with the issue of whether a private cause
of action existed under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 when Davis
was refused admission to a college-nursing program due to a
hearing disability.'28 The Court refused to recognize a cause of
action under the Rehabilitation Act, but disposed of the case by
finding that the Rehabilitation Act did not require the college to
extend affirmative action for the disabled and that the institution
was free to enact reasonable physical qualifications for
admission. 129 The majority established that the line will not always
be clear between refusal to extend affirmative action and illegal
discrimination, and that the college's unwillingness to make major
modifications did not amount to discrimination. 130 The Court also
stated that the purpose of the program was to train persons to
serve in the nursing profession and substantial modifications made
to reduce the qualifications for a disabled person would frustrate
the goals of the program.
31
Over a decade after passage of the Rehabilitation Act, the Court
finally recognized a private cause of action thereunder in
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone.132 The issue presented to the
Court was whether a private citizen may bring an action for back
pay on the basis of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.'3
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Rains, supra note 119, at 190.
126. Id. at 189.
127. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
128. Southeast Cmty. Coll., 442 U.S. at 400.
129. Id. at 414.
130. Id. at 412-13.
131. Id. at 413.
132. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
133. Consolidated Rail Corp., 465 U.S. at 630. The Court's decision took into
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The plaintiff was terminated by Consolidated after the plaintiff lost
his arm in an accident, although Consolidated had no justification
for a determination that the plaintiff was unfit for his occupation. 3 4
The majority found the disabled worker did have standing under
the Rehabilitation Act and he was entitled to back pay for being
discrininatorily dismissed.'- Consolidated fostered the argument
that under Title VI of the Rehabilitation Act, the Act only applies
when the "primary objective" of federal assistance is to promote
employment.'3 The Supreme Court rejected this application of Title
VI and provided that neither the legislative history, nor the express
language, placed any such limitation on the power of the
Rehabilitation Act.
37
The Supreme Court continued its quest to discern the scope of
the Rehabilitation Act in School Board of Nassau County, Florida
v. Arline.'-a A schoolteacher suffering from a susceptibility to
tuberculosis was terminated from her teaching position solely on
the basis of her medical condition.13 The Court was presented with
the issue of whether a person suffering from a contagious disease
would qualify as a disabled individual under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973.140 The majority found that the schoolteacher was
substantially limited by her deficiency and that her record of
impairment qualified her as disabled under the Rehabilitation Act.' 4'
The Court also recognized that permitting discrimination based on
the contagious condition of a disability would thwart the basic
intention of the Rehabilitation Act, which is to eliminate all forms
of discrimination against the disabled.
142
The majority resolved the case by determining that an individual
inquiry must be accorded to the schoolteacher to determine if the
teacher would be qualified to work in the school atmosphere. 43
consideration a 1978 amendment to the Rehabilitation Act, which incorporated the remedies,
procedures, and rights of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 626.
134. Id. at 628.
135. Id. at 637. The Court recognized the standing of a private plaintiff without
concrete analysis, but reinforced that the protection of the Rehabilitation Act would be
afforded to individuals discriminated against by any federally funded program regardless of
whether employment was the primary purpose of the funding. Id.
136. Id. at 631.
137. Id. at 633.
138. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
139. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla., 480 U.S. at 276.
140. Id. at 277.
141. Id. at 281.
142. Id. at 284.
143. Id. at 287.
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This inquiry must evaluate the nature, duration, and contagiousness
of the impairment.'1 The Court took a major stride in the
elimination of discrimination by finding that contagious diseases
were protected under the Rehabilitation Act.145
After the shortfalls of the Rehabilitation Act became evident,
Congress realized that a stronger piece of legislation was necessary
to "remedy widespread discrimination against disabled individuals"
in private enterprises. 146 Congress recognized a "compelling need"
for a "clear and comprehensive national mandate" to eradicate
discrimination perpetrated against disabled individuals. 47 Congress
introduced the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA') in 1988, and
President Bush signed it into law in 1990.'48
In passing the ADA, Congress recognized that forty-three million
Americans have a physical or mental disability, and historically the
disabled were isolated and segregated by society, which treatment
continues to be a "serious and pervasive social problem."49 The
legislation also listed four main goals, including: "1) to provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities, 2) to enact
stricter standards, 3) to assure a central role of federal government,
and 4) to invoke the sweep of Congressional authority."150 The
ADA, in its broad scope, worked to afford disabled individuals the
opportunity to function on an equal basis and with open access to
areas whose previous inaccessibility limited the opportunities
afforded to the disabled.15' The ADA provided a broad mandate in
which the judiciary would have substantial deference to loosely
apply the provisions of the ADA.
152
One of the most important cases that expressed the breadth of
the ADA was Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yesky.'5
The issue before the Court was whether Title U1 of the ADA applied
to inmates within state-controlled prisons.1M Yesky was sentenced
144. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla., 480 U.S. at 288.
145. Id. at 273-74.
146. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1889.
147. Id.
148. Julie L. Livergood, Walking with Tradition v. Riding into Tomorrow: Ollinger v.
United States Golf Association, 51 DEPAUL L REv. 125, 131 (2001).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
150. Id.
151. Livergood, supra note 147, at 132.
152. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1889.
153. Pa. Dep't of Corrections, 524 U.S. at 206.
154. Id. at 208. Title II requires that: "No qualified individual with a disability shall be
• . . excluded from participation in or be denied benefits of the services, programs, or
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to a motivational boot camp for first-time offenders, but was
rejected due to a medical history of high blood pressure. 155 Justice
Scalia stated that the express language of the ADA was
unambiguous and that it clearly covered state discrimination
against a state penal inmate.'1 The state argued that prisoners were
not included under the ADA because they were not expressly
mentioned in the statute.
157
The majority rejected this argument by contending "[the fact
that] a statute can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated
by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates
breadth."158 Justice Scalia also recognized that the activities
provided by a prison system to inmates did fall under the scope of
Title II as benefits or services.m Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections established a strong precedent for the judiciary to
apply a broad construction to the ADA in order to effectuate the
goals established by Congress.
The Supreme Court next moved to determine the proper scope
of the term "disabled" within the ADA in Sutton v. U.S. Airlines,
Inc.160 In Sutton, two applicants for the commercial airline pilot
program were rejected from employment due to inadequate vision
and the need for corrective lenses. 61 The issue for review was
whether a person is to be evaluated, as to a disability under the
ADA, in light of corrective measures taken to remedy the
deficiency.'6 Justice O'Connor recognized that under the language
of the ADA, the effect of corrective measures, both positive and
negative, must be recognized in the determination of whether an
individual is "substantially limited" in any major activity of daily
life.163 The majority also recognized the mandate that the
determination of the existence of a disability must be made
through an individual inquiry.1 4 The Court concluded that the
activities of a public entity... " Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 213.
157. Id. at 212.
158. Pa. Dep't of Corrections, 524 U.S. at 212.
159. Id. at 210.
160. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
161. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
162. Id. at 481. The definition of the "disability" within the ADA includes a "physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an
individual, a record of such impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment."
Id. at 478.
163. Id. at 482.
164. Id. at 483.
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plaintiffs were not substantially limited by their vision problem and
were not provided the protection of the ADA against U.S. Air's
vision requirement provision.'6 The judicial delineation of the term
"disability" within the statute was a major step for future
application of the ADA. The Supreme Court has consistently
eliminated areas of uncertainty in the ADA since its inception in
1990.
In the context of the history of the interpretation of disability
legislation, a major question of the application of Title III of the
ADA arose in the area of sports in Sandison v. Michigan High
School Athletic Assn.'6 A number of the circuits addressed the
issue in Sandison regarding whether a maximum age provision in
interscholastic sports discriminates against disabled individuals
held back due to a learning disability. 67 In Sandison, a student
with an auditory input disability and a student with a learning
disability were held back in grammar school, and subsequently
sought an injunction against the athletic association for prohibiting
their participation in athletics under a maximum age provision. 168
Applying Title III of the ADA, the majority found that the athletic
association was not considered to be a place of public
accommodation by recognizing the athletic association as a public
entity, which is not covered under Title III.169 The court also
recognized that waiver of the age restriction would not reflect a
reasonable modification.170 The majority established that evaluation
of the competitive advantage that an older student may possess
would be a daunting and highly hypothetical task.'7 ' Second, it was
established that a waiver of the age requirement would work as a
fundamental alteration to the sports program because of drastic
effect that age may play in the physical maturity of a high school
student. 72 The court refused to recognize any discrimination by the
athletic association under either the Rehabilitation Act or the
ADA.173
By early 2000, the circuits were in conflict on the issue of
whether the use of a motorized cart fundamentally altered the
165. Id. at 494.
166. 64 F3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
167. Sandison, 64 F3d at 1029.
168. Id. at 1028.
169. Id. at 1036.
170. Id. at 1037.
171. Id.
172. Sandison, 64 F3d at 1035.
173. Id. at 1037.
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nature of professional golf tournaments.'7 4 A day after the Ninth
Circuit recognized in Martin that the use of a cart did not alter the
nature of professional golf tournaments, the Seventh Circuit
reached a contradictory conclusion in Olinger v. U.S. Golf
Association ("USGA!'). 175 Olinger suffered from bilateral avascular
necrosis, which is a degenerative impairment that makes walking
difficult.176 Olinger applied to the USGA for a waiver of its walking
rule for the U.S. Open, the men's national championship of golf.
177
When the USGA refused, Olinger successfully acquired a temporary
injunction, which allowed him to compete in the qualifying
events.'78 On appeal, the court decided that though the viewing
public was covered by the ADA, the competitors behind the ropes
were not covered under the public accommodation provision of
Title III of the ADA.' 79 The majority also recognized that elimination
of the walking rule would work a fundamental alteration to the
nature of the game by eliminating stamina as a major testing
factor.'18 The court cited testimony of some of golf's greatest to
relate the significant impact that stamina can play in the outcome
of a tournament.'8 ' The court concluded that the USGA was not
mandated in making an accommodation under the ADA, but
suggested that the USGA should possibly voluntarily provide the
accommodation. '
In response to the conflict that arose in the circuits on the
determination of the scope of Title III, the Supreme Court found
the issue of such significance to merit resolution. Armed with legal
precedent from almost four decades of interpretation of
discrimination legislation, the Court attempted to further define the
breadth of the newly created ADA. In its analysis, the Court
rendered its interpretation of the ADA with reference to the
culmination of standards set in the Civil Rights Act, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the early attempts to define other
174. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct at 1888.
175. Olinger, 205 E3d at 1001.
176. Id. at 1002.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1004. Olinger failed to advance to the sectional of the tournament- Id. The
trial court entered judgment in favor of the USGA, fmding that the waiver would act as a
fundamental alteration to the nature of the tournament. Id. at 1004.
179. Id.
180. Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005.
181. Id. at 1006.
182. Id. at 1007. The Supreme Court held that the seventh circuit's judgment against
Olinger should be vacated and that the case should be remanded for further review in light
of the PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin. Olinger v. U.S. Golf Ass'n., 121 S.Ct. 2212 (2001).
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provisions of the ADA. The resolution of the scope of the ADA,
within the arena of professional sports, has generated heated
debate in the American public. The complexity and wide scope of
judicial interpretation of the ADA has opened the Court to scrutiny
from a large portion of the populace.
Though the decision rendered in PGA Tour, Inc. appears to
strike an equitable resolution to a heartfelt story of determination,
the practice of law requires us to abandon our sympathies to
interpret the desired intent of the authoring legislature. PGA Tour,
Inc. presents a moving case that deserves recognition by the PGA,
but it is outside of the scope of the ADA to provide a basis for
relief. The express language of the ADA and the existing precedent
under the discrimination cases provide that the ADA should not
cover the members of Martin's class within professional sports.
Though the legislature had demonstrated that the ADA should be
applied in a broad fashion, the courts must still enforce the
unambiguous language of the ADA directly and interpret the
ambiguous language of Title III in recognition of the overall
statutory scheme. The delineation of examples of public
accommodations within the statute is not an exclusive list, but any
further additions must be made in light of the general
characteristics of those provided on the list. The statute lists golf
courses in the same category as a gymnasium, health spa, or
bowling alley.183 The general trait of the category is that each place
therein is a place of recreation open to the public. The legislature
clearly did not intend to encompass a place of professional sports
competition within the category intended to govern public
recreational activities. Further, Martin is a professional athlete
seeking a livelihood, rather than the use of a public facility for
recreation. It is recognized that the spectators viewing the
tournament would come within the intent of "public recreation,"
but the area of professional competition inside the ropes will not
fall within a place of public accommodation within the statute.
The definition of Martin as a client or customer is also offline
with the general intent of the public accommodation provision. The
Court has repeatedly determined Title III to refer only to clients
and customers of the public accommodation. The basis of Title I
is the protection of individuals from discrimination in places that
provide services to the general public. Martin is a professional
athlete who makes his living from participation in PGA events,
183. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1890.
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from which he is receiving the privilege of work as an independent
contractor and not as a client or customer of the services the PGA
provides. The legislature clearly excluded independent contractors
from the sweep of Title I (employment provisions), and their
inclusion within Title III would run counter to the intent of
Congress to carve out an exception for independent contractors.
18
The Court, in its overextension of the public accommodation
language, disregarded the legislative purpose of the exception in
eliminating burdensome remedial measures for those contracting
with an outside party.18 This may shift excessive financial burdens
to small proprietors, which would frustrate the capabilities of their
businesses. The Court's expansion of the statute has produced gray
areas in the law in which parties may be uncertain as to their
status under the ADA.
The Court also overstepped the express language of the statute
in the interpretation of the duty of the public accommodation. The
language of the statute provides only that the accommodation
provide "access" to its services and not totally adapt the service to
accommodate a disabled person's needs. In Southeast Community
College v. Davis, the Court recognized that a college nursing
program had no affirmative duty to act and that the nursing
program had a legitimate purpose in enacting reasonable physical
qualifications. 186 The PGA operates a tournament with the purpose
of placing the elite of a sport in a fair competition, and the nature
of the sport provides that it is necessary to have some physical
qualifications. The ADA requires that the PGA not prohibit entrance
to the competitions based on a disability, but it is not required to
affirmatively act to alter the rules of the game to place Martin on
an equal footing. The purpose of professional sports is to compare
individuals in a game, taldng into account their physical and mental
strengths and weaknesses. The elimination of an element to place a
player on an equal physical level would be counter to the nature of
sport.
The determination by the Court of whether a fundamental
alteration to the service occurred was also flawed. The rules of a
184. Id. at 1898 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Presumably, those homeowners who contract with
parties such as electricians or other home repairmen would be forced to take affirmative
action to provide access to the job for any disabled contractor. Employers with fewer than
15 employees, which are exempt under itle I, would also be forced to take affirmative
remedial measures since they provide the service of employment.
186. 442 U.S. at 397.
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game are arbitrary in nature and modification of any of the rules
takes away a characteristic of the game. The courts should not be
provided the task of determining what rules are necessary or
peripheral to a game; rather, such a determination should be left to
the governing body of the sport. The arbitrary nature of rules in
sport makes it folly for courts to attend to discerning the necessity
of rules of a game. The Court also took a step in the wrong
direction by prescribing that a court must make an individualized
inquiry to determine whether a fundamental alteration has
occurred. In Arline and Sutton, the court only recognized an
individual inquiry for the determination of whether an individual's
infirmity would be encompassed by the term "disability" in the
statutory language.187 The extension of an individualized inquiry to
all areas of the application of the ADA will provide the courts with
an excess of litigation and without the proper guidance in
determining the presence of a fundamental alteration. Many
intricate factual cases will need to be continually screened by the
courts to monitor whether the alteration has a significant burden
on the accommodation, which will consume a large portion of the
judiciary.
The holding in PGA Tour, Inc. has thrown the state of the law
under the ADA into disarray. The excessively broad interpretation
of the statute provides little guidance as to the entities covered by
the statute. The Court basically stated that though not in line with
the express wording of the statute, it will expand the entities
covered by the statute because the legislature generally intended to
eliminate discrimination. This interpretation will leave those
provided with exceptions to the ADA in doubt as to the application
of the statute. The determination of the Court as to an individual
inquiry will also leave the lower courts with little guidance as to
the application of the ADA. The Court failed to set a standard or
develop a test to assist the lower courts in the intricacies of the
application of the statute. The wide discretion of the trial judges in
the determinations of reasonable modifications may result in a
slippery slope, which may overpower the intent of the statute. The
PGA Tour, Inc. decision has provided the lower courts with the
task of continually making decisions as to the breadth of the
statute. The discretion of the court in the many fact finding cases,
as to reasonable modifications, may allow the scope of the ADA to
sweep like wildfire.
187. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fta., 480 U.S. at 276; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
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The final issue of importance is that the court's non-specific
interpretation of the ADA will invoke a mass of litigation from all
areas of the ADA. One can perceive a sea of litigation that will flow
from the playgrounds, athletic fields, and professional sports
arenas.
David A. Monaghan

